chapter 10 "Promising" ideas: Hobbes and contract in Spinoza's political philosophy
Don Garrett
Broken promises don't bother me. I just think, "Why did they believe me?" (Deep Thoughts, by Jack Handy) Like Hobbes, Spinoza prominently invokes promising and contract or covenant 1 in his discussion of the foundations of the state -primarily, though not exclusively, in his Theological-Political Treatise. But how does Spinoza understand their nature and significance, and how, if at all, does his understanding of them differ from that of Hobbes? I begin by posing a set of related puzzles concerning the interpretation of Spinoza's claims about promises and contracts specifically as they relate to Hobbes. I then compare the doctrines of Hobbes and Spinoza concerning several key topics: rights and powers; good and evil; reason and passion; and faith and deception. Finally, I appeal to these doctrines to resolve the puzzles about the nature and significance of promising and contract in Spinoza's political philosophy.
1 puzzles about hobbes and spinoza on promising and contract The similarities between the political philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza are striking, extensive, and deep. Both philosophers aim to ground a scientific treatment of politics on a fundamental principle of endeavor for self-preservation. Both assign a theoretical role to a pre-political "state of nature," and both ascribe a nearly unlimited "right of nature" to human beings to do as they will in that state. Both conceive the commonwealth or state as a composite entity instituted through a contract in which its members transfer rights. Both maintain that the commonwealth has a right to determine the form of religion, 2 and both invest substantial effort in the interpretation of Scripture -in large part because of the political significance of scriptural interpretation for European states such as their own. Both are concerned, as part of that interpretation, with explicating the nature and terms of the particular contract reported in Scripture between God and the ancient Hebrews, 3 as well as with understanding the contracts that give rise to commonwealths more generally.
4
Some striking divergences of view are evident as well. For one, Hobbes argues that the best form of government is monarchy, whereas Spinoza argues that it is democracy. For another, Hobbes proposes that the state exercise substantial control over speech and religion, whereas Spinoza recommends that it generally allow broad latitude in both areas. Yet to a very considerable extent, these disagreements are practical rather than theoretical, grounded to be sure partly in different conceptions of the good but even more in different overall assessments of how best to enhance the prudential quality of public decision-making and prevent civil instability 5 -differing assessments no doubt related to the two philosophers' differing experiences with their own commonwealths.
Evidence of a subtler but potentially more fundamental differencedespite the two philosophers' seeming agreement about the importance of covenant in creating and maintaining a commonwealth -appears in the opposing treatments they give to a stock problem concerning an explicit promise made to a robber in order to obtain one's freedom. In De Civewhich Spinoza had in his library -Hobbes writes:
It is an usual question, whether compacts extorted from us through fear, do oblige or not. For example, if, to redeem my life from the power of a robber, I promise to pay him . . . next day, and that I will do no act whereby to apprehend and bring him to justice: whether I am tied to keep promise or not? But though such a promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear . . . It holds universally true, that promises do don garrett oblige when there is some benefit received, and that to promise, and the thing promised, be lawful. But it is lawful, for the redemption of my life, both to promise and to give what I will of mine own to any man, even to a thief. We are obliged, therefore, by promises proceeding from fear, except the civil law forbid them; by virtue whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawful.
6
In his TTP, in contrast, Spinoza writes without qualification:
For the universal law of human nature is that no one fails to pursue anything which he judges to be good, unless he hopes for a greater good, or fears a greater harm; nor does he submit to any evil, except to avoid a greater one, or because he hopes for a greater good . . . But from this it follows necessarily that no one will promise to give up the right he has to all things except with intent to deceive, and absolutely, that no one will stand by his promises unless he fears a greater evil or hopes for a greater good. To understand this better, suppose a Robber forces me to promise him that I will give him my goods when he wishes. Since, as I have already shown, my natural right is determined only by my power, it is certain that if I can free myself from this Robber by deceptively promising him whatever he wishes, I am permitted to do this by natural right, to contract deceptively for whatever he wishes . . . From these considerations we conclude that no contract can have any force except by reason of its utility. If the utility is taken away, the contract is taken away with it, and is null and void.
7
This verdict, and particularly the final conclusion drawn from it, may seem in tension with what he goes on to say almost immediately:
If all men could easily be led solely by the guidance of reason, and could recognize the supreme utility and necessity of the state, there would be no one who would not absolutely detest deceptions; with supreme reliability, everyone would stand by their contracts completely, out of a desire for this supreme good, the preservation of the state; above all else, they would maintain trust, the most important protection of the state.
8
It seems equally in tension with Spinoza's seemingly more demanding statements in Proposition 72 of Part 4 of the Ethics about the model free man. As Edwin Curley translates the proposition, 9 it reads:
Proposition 72: A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively.
Demonstration: If a free man, insofar as he is free, did anything by deception, he would do it from the dictate of reason (for so far only do we call him free). And so it would be a virtue to act deceptively (by P24), and hence (by the same Prop.), everyone would be better advised to act deceptively to preserve his being. I.e. (as P1 20, 2010 9:19 "Promising" ideas 195
is known through itself ), men would be better advised to agree only in words, and be contrary to one another in fact. But this is absurd (by P31C). Therefore, a free man etc., q.e.d.
Scholium: Suppose someone now asks: what if a man could save himself from the present danger of death by treachery? Would not the principle of preserving his own being recommend, without qualification, that he be treacherous?
The reply to this is the same. If reason should recommend that, it would recommend it to all men. And so reason would recommend, without qualification, that men make agreements, join forces, and have common rights only by deceptioni.e., that really they have no common rights. This is absurd.
In seeking to understand Spinoza's views on promises and contracts as they contrast with those of Hobbes, we might hope for illumination from his own characterizations of his disagreements with Hobbes. Spinoza makes two such remarks, both bearing clearly if somewhat indirectly on our topic; yet each is puzzling in its own way. Thus, he writes in an Annotation to Chapter 16 of the TTP:
No matter what state a man is in, he can be free. For certainly a man is free insofar as he is led by reason. But (contrary to Hobbes) reason urges peace in all circumstances; moreover, peace cannot be obtained unless the common rights of the state are maintained without infringement. Therefore, the more a man is led by reason, i.e., the more he is free, the more will he steadfastly maintain the rights of the state and carry out the commands of the supreme power of which he is a subject.
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It seems surprising that Spinoza characterizes Hobbes as denying that reason urges peace in all circumstances, since Hobbes states that "the first, and fundamental law of nature" -from which he derives the obligation to keep covenants -is "to seek peace and follow it,"
11 and he characterizes all of the laws of nature as "dictates of reason." Indeed, if anyone questions the universal rationality of peace, it would seem to be Spinoza himself, for no one seems more ready to allow violations of peace contracts, at least between states, than he:
Allies are men of two states which, to avoid the danger of war, or to gain some other advantage, contract with one another not to harm one another, but on the contrary, to come to one another's aid in cases of need, though each retains its own sovereignty. This contract will be valid just as long as its foundation, the principle of danger, or of advantage, is present. For no one makes a contract or is bound to stand by a contract, except out of hope for some good, or anxiety about some evil. If this foundation should be removed, the contract is removed of itself. While the note just cited constitutes Spinoza's only use of Hobbes's name in work originally intended for publication, he does mention Hobbes once more in his correspondence. Replying to Jarig Jelles four years after the publication of the TTP, he writes:
With regard to Politics, the difference between Hobbes and me, about which you inquire, consists in this, that I ever preserve the natural right intact so that the Supreme Power in a state has no more right over a subject than is proportionate to the power by which it is superior to the subject.
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Yet this, too, seems at first sight to get the relation between Hobbes and Spinoza exactly backwards. For while Hobbes maintains that the fundamental natural right of self-preservation, at least, is inalienable in the covenant instituting a commonwealth, Spinoza refers repeatedly not only to partial transfers of right to the sovereign power 14 but also of subjects ceding "all their power of defending themselves -i.e., all their right" 15 and "completely surrendering their natural right."
16 Far from "preserving the natural right intact" in the social contract, Spinoza appears to annihilate it entirely.
2 key doctrines in hobbes and spinoza In order to understand Spinoza's view of promises and contracts, as well as his differences with Hobbes in this regard, it is necessary to understand some of their central doctrines concerning rights and powers, good and evil, reason and passion, and faith and deception. Let us turn to those topics in order.
Rights and powers. For Hobbes, a right is a "liberty to do or forebear," where a "liberty" is the absence of an impediment to the exercise of one's power. The Right of Nature, in particular, is 20, 2010 9:19 "Promising" ideas 197 the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
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To lay aside a right, whether by renouncing or transferring it, is to divest oneself, by sufficient signs of the will, either verbal or non-verbal, of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his or her own right to a thing. He defines a contract as a mutual transfer of rights, and a covenant as a contract in which at least one party is to perform at a later time.
In the covenant that constitutes the social contract, individuals agree to authorize the actions of "one man or an assembly of men" as their own and to give up their right of governing themselves to this man or assembly on condition that all others do likewise. While this covenant involves giving up the right to be judge for oneself of what is or is not conducive to one's own preservation, it nevertheless has limits: individuals cannot give up their right to defend their own lives or bodies, nor can they give up certain other "liberties of subjects," which include resisting physical harm, availing themselves of the necessities of life, and abstaining from executing dangerous or dishonorable offices. 18 These exceptions are grounded ultimately for Hobbes at least in part in requirements on the interpretation of actions -no one can be understood, by any word or action, to be willing the loss of these rights in a social contract.
19 Indeed, in the absence of an enforcing power for covenants -a "power to hold them all in awe," in Hobbes's well-known phrase -covenants are generally rendered void by the suspicion that the second party would fail to perform and would instead simply take advantage of the first performance by the other party.
Spinoza, too, recognizes an extensive "right of nature." Arguing from the principles (i) that God has sovereign right over all things, (ii) that the power of nature is the power of God, and (iii) that the power of nature is the power of individual things taken together, he concludes that each individual's right of nature extends to "everything in its power" without restriction, so that nothing is outside natural right but "what no one desires and what no one can do."
20 His metaphysical doctrine that all activity is pursuit of self-preservation 21 renders Hobbes's restriction of the right of nature to action aiming at self-preservation trivial. But he also goes beyond P1: aaa Trim: 228mm × 152mm
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Hobbes in claiming explicitly that natural right and power are necessarily coextensive.
In addition to natural right, Spinoza also recognizes what he calls "private civil right": "the freedom each person has to preserve himself in his state, which is determined by the edicts of the supreme power, and is defended only by its authority."
22 In principle, for Spinoza, a social contract creating the state would be one in which individuals cede all of their right to the state, so that private civil right would be limited to what the state in fact allows or protects. In practice, however, things are otherwise. Natural right is originally unlimited in theory, inasmuch as it is unrestricted by a state, but in practice it is extremely meager because human beings without the security of a state have very little power to do anything. Similarly, the right of the state against the individual is in principle unlimited by any restrictions imposed on it in a contract, but it is in fact limited by the inability of a state to acquire complete power over its subjects. Human beings cannot in fact give up the right to pursue their advantage or self-preservation as they see it, nor to believe what seems to them most likely, nor to abstain from dangerous or dishonorable tasks. These limitations on the rights conveyed are not grounded, as for Hobbes, in the alleged impossibility of giving convincing tokens of the will to lay them down; rather, the rights themselves cannot be ceded simply because the corresponding power cannot be given up. While this may seem to be a distinction without a difference, it will prove to be significant.
Given that whatever is done with right is permissible, it may seem that Spinoza's doctrine that right is coextensive with power amounts to a kind of moral nihilism, since it follows that whatever anyone actually does is permissible. In fact, however, it amounts only to a rejection of the framework of obligations and permissions as a basis for drawing absolute moral distinctions. (In a parallel way, his necessitarianism, according to which whatever is possible is actual and whatever is actual is necessary, entails the rejection of a particular framework -in this case, a metaphysical frameworkas a basis for drawing absolute modal distinctions. And just as Spinoza's necessitarianism still allows him to distinguish what is possible from what is impossible relative to some restricted set of laws or circumstances, so too he can still distinguish what is permissible from what is impermissible relative to some specified body of laws or commands.) Since Spinoza denies that indignation is ever appropriate -both because it is a kind of sadness (tristitia) and because it always reflects an inadequate understanding of the P1: aaa Trim: 228mm × 152mm
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causal history of the behavior in question 23 -there is indeed some point in terms of appropriate moral attitudes to his rejection of the possibility of "impermissible" actions or actions "without right." But this would constitute a rejection of moral distinctions altogether only if he rejected all other vocabularies and frameworks for drawing and embracing such distinctions as well -and that he does not do. On the contrary, philosophers, in his view, "follow virtue not as a law, but out of love, because it is the best thing."
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Good and evil. According to Hobbes, "whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good."
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This designation of something as good is always "relative to the person that useth the terms, since no common rule is to be taken from the nature of objects themselves." We nevertheless construe disagreements in what we call "good" as disagreements in judgment because we mistakenly take a projection of our own desires for the discernment of an objective feature of things. It is because ascriptions of goodness follow desire that Hobbes can assert that "of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself."
26 Hobbes insists, however, that there is no summum bonum or highest good. Rather, felicity consists in "a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter."
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Spinoza agrees that, as the term "good" (bonum) is typically used, it cannot be said that we desire things because we see that they are good, but rather that we call things "good" because we desire them.
28 It is with regard to this usage that he writes:
For the universal law of human nature is that no one fails to pursue anything which he judges to be good, unless he hopes for a greater good, or fears a greater harm; nor does he submit to any evil, except to avoid a greater one, or because he hopes for a greater good. I.e., between two goods, each person chooses the one he judges to be greater, and between two evils, the one which seems to him lesser. I say explicitly: the one which seems to the person choosing to be greater or lesser, and not that things necessarily are as he judges them to be. And this law is so firmly inscribed in human nature, that it ought to be numbered among the eternal truths, which no one can fail to know.
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In addition to this vulgar usage, however, Spinoza also stipulates in the Ethics a more scientific sense for "good" and "evil" (malum). Thus, in the Preface to Part 4, he defines "good" as "what we know certainly is a means 20, 2010 9:19 200 don garrett by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves," and in Definition 1 of Part 4, he defines "good" -presumably in a way that is meant to be equivalent -as "what we certainly know to be useful to us." It is in this more scientific sense of "good," and not in the popular sense, that it is possible to "see and approve the better, but follow the worse." 30 Propositions 27-50 of Ethics Part 4 are largely devoted to demonstrating what is good and what is evil in this sense. Particularly important for present purposes is the following: "Things which are of assistance to the common Society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; those, on the other hand, are evil which bring discord to the State" 31 -a sentiment echoed and amplified, of course, in the TTP.
Contrary to Hobbes, Spinoza affirms that there is a summum bonum, namely, "knowledge of God."
32 Possession of this highest good is not exclusive. On the contrary, one can hardly achieve any considerable degree of it without the cooperation of others who agree with oneself in nature (e.g., who are not pulled in opposing directions by contrary passions) and with whom one can, as it were, constitute "one Mind and one Body."
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At a minimum, these are fellow citizens in a state; at best, they are fellow philosophers and intellectual co-inquirers.
34 Because one's own advantage must be understood in terms of "persevering in one's being," however, Spinoza must offer an account of how knowledge of God constitutes 35 a kind of persevering in being that is higher and more perfect than merely continuing to exist for a longer period of duration -long life being an outcome that can hardly be guaranteed by any knowledge of God that human beings are likely to acquire. He offers this account in Ethics Part 5, where he argues that knowledge of God maximizes the "part of the mind that is eternal." Having a mind the greater part of which is eternal gives one control over the passions and diminishes one's fear of death. And indeed living a short life filled with the blessedness that comes from the knowledge of God (as Spinoza himself did, we may assume) is preferable to a life of longer duration and lesser knowledge. For a good discussion of issues concerning the rationality of cooperation in Spinoza's philosophy, see Rosenthal, "Two Collective Action Problems." 35 Given the way in which Spinoza has defined "good," he is not committed, as Aristotle was, to the doctrine that the summum bonum is non-instrumental. In fact, however, it is plausible to regard knowledge of God not just as producing but as constituting the highest kind of perseverance in being. 36 Youpa, "Spinozistic Self-Preservation," has argued that, because the free man guided by reason has a greater part of the mind that is eternal, he would not harm his eternal part for the sake of a lesser P1: aaa Trim: 228mm × 152mm Top: 11.95mm Gutter: 18.98mm CUUK1157-10 CUUK1157/Melamed ISBN: 978 0 521 88229 3 July 20, 2010 9:19
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Reason and passion. Hobbes characterizes reason as the "reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts."
37 Because passions often lead one to act in ways that frustrate the satisfaction of one's desires, reason and passion can come into conflict in motivating human beings. At times, Hobbes seems to imply that self-preservation, as an end, has a particular relation to reason that is not exhausted by its status as the object of the most basic desire and one whose satisfaction is a prerequisite for the satisfaction of almost all other desires.
38 In any case, however, reason is capable of providing general theorems about how to preserve oneself and achieve a more commodious life, and hence to obtain what individuals regard as good. These theorems are "dictates" of reason and constitute what can be called the "laws of nature." Spinoza, too, ascribes a motivational role to reason, and one that is often in conflict with passions. Because every affect is also an idea, and each singular thing strives to persevere in its being as a matter of metaphysical necessity, to understand some object as genuinely good in the scientific sense is ipso facto to have some desire for it, a desire that may conflict with other desires. He identifies reason (ratio) as the second of three kinds of cognition.
39 Unlike imagination (imaginatio), the lowest kind of cognition, reason is intellectual and consists in ideas that are adequate and true. Unlike intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva), the highest kind of cognition, it is a way of "perceiving many things at once," and is therefore inherently general. Accordingly, it provides us with general "rules" or "dictates" of reason, and Spinoza seems very insistent on their universal form and high level of generality. Propositions 51-66 of Ethics Part 4 are concerned primarily with acting under the guidance of reason and include the key claim: "From the guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils."
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Because reason provides only general rules for action, it alone is insufficient for action in the external world: one must have some awareness of one's immediate situation, and this can typically only be achieved through sensation and memory, which are forms of imagination. Nevertheless, the more powerfully one's reason-produced adequate ideas play the leading role as desires in determining one's actions, the more one is guided by reason. Guidance by reason is thus a matter of degree, as is resemblance good by breaking his word. However, he does not show how breaking one's word would itself be a cause (as opposed to a relatively common effect) of lack of virtue or freedom. 20, 2010 9:19 202 don garrett to the ideal "free man" -an ideal that is "the model of human nature we place before ourselves" mentioned in Spinoza's definition of "good" and described in the final seven propositions of Ethics Part 4. Just as no one can be solely guided by reason, so no one can be a completely free man.
To be completely free is to be determined to existence and action by one's own nature alone, 41 and hence to be God, whereas all human beings are to varying degrees subject to external forces. Nevertheless, just as some individuals are more guided by reason and others less, so some individuals are freer and others less. Likewise, to be free and guided by reason is to act from virtue -that is, from power to persevere in one's being.
42 Because a virtuous and free individual guided by reason is genuinely the (relatively) adequate cause of his or her own actions, approbation (favor) -unlike indignation -can be appropriate; such approbation is itself, in Spinoza's words, "not contrary to reason."
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Reason tells us what is good or evil considered independent of the alternatives, but it does not prevent goods from coming into conflict within one another. Rather, it tells us to follow, in such cases, "the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils." Spinoza gives revealing examples of such conflicts in the TP. He begins by noting, as he did in the TTP, that contracts between commonwealths are limited by their utility to both parties:
Therefore each State has an undiminished right to break the treaty whenever it wants to; it cannot be said that it acts deceitfully or treacherously because it goes back on its assurance as soon as the cause of fear or hope is taken away, because this condition was equal for each of the contracting parties: whichever one could first be free of fear would be its own master, and would use its freedom as it thought best. Moreover, no one contracts for the future except on the assumption of certain anticipated circumstances. If these circumstances change, then the nature of the whole situation changes. That is why each of the allied States retains the right to look after itself, and why each of them strives, as far as it can, to be beyond fear, and hence, to be its own master, and why each of them strives to prevent the other from becoming more powerful. So, if any State complains that it has been deceived, it cannot condemn the honesty of the allied State, but only its own foolishness, because it entrusted its own well-being to another State, which was its own master and for which the well-being of its own state is the supreme law. On the contrary, I will act more properly if I undertake to restore it to its owners. Similarly, if the sovereign has promised to do something for someone else, and afterward time or reason has taught, or seems to have taught, that it will harm the common well-being of his subjects, surely he is bound to break his word. Therefore, since Scripture teaches only in general that we should keep our word, and leaves the particular cases where exceptions are to be made to the judgment of each person, it teaches nothing which is incompatible with what we have just shown.
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These are both cases, cleverly enough, in which one properly (that is, without acting contrary to reason) breaks one's word for the sake of something else that is also good for others: returning stolen property, or safeguarding the welfare of subjects. But given the definitional identity between what is good and what conduces to one's own advantage, reason could hardly allow that one break one's word for a sufficient good to others without also allowing that one break it for a sufficient good to oneself; on the contrary, it could only allow that one break it for others if doing so thereby brought or constituted a greater good for oneself as well.
Faith and deception. In the Introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes criticizes the hearts of men "blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines," but he does not list among the laws of nature any general prohibition against lying. He does, in contrast, state as the third law of nature "that men perform their covenants made," and he characterizes violations of this law as "promise-breaking" or "not keeping faith." Since making a covenant involves an act of the will, Hobbes regards the breaking of covenant as a kind of practical contradiction and hence irrationality, in which an agent both does and undoes the same thing. The law of nature requiring performance of covenants applies only to valid covenants; and chief among the conditions that prevent or invalidate a covenant is the suspicion of non-performance by a later party that typically results from the absence of a sovereign "power to hold them all 20, 2010 9:19 204 don garrett in awe." Nevertheless, Hobbes argues, in his famous "Reply to the Fool" 46 that, if the first party to a covenant does perform, the second party is then obliged to perform as well -evidently, at least in part, because signaling in this way the importance one attaches to uniting in cooperative contractual arrangements is highly conducive to self-preservation. Like Hobbes, Spinoza does not propound any general principle against lying. It may seem that he does so in the previously cited E4p72 -"A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively" -but this appearance is an artifact of translation. The topic of that proposition is not deception generally, in the sense of inducing belief in what is not true. Spinoza would certainly have no compunction about deceiving non-human animals in that sense, and arguably the TTP is intended to deceive its less astute readers in some respects. (Indeed, E4p72 itself is arguably intended to have the same effect.) Nor is the topic of the proposition even out-and-out lying generally, in the sense of asserting what one knows or believes to be false. (Note that the TTP was published, presumably with Spinoza's knowledge, under a false imprint ["Hamburg"] .) Rather, "honestly" translates Spinoza's cum fide and "deceptively" translates his dolo malo. Hobbes typically uses cum fide (with faith) and dolo (by trickery or deception) to describe keeping and breaking faith in his sense, which is specific to promises and contracts. Moreover, Spinoza always uses throughout E4p72, including its demonstration and scholium, the more specific term dolus malus (literally, "evil trickery or deception"), a term that can be readily contrasted with dolus bonus (literally, "good trickery or deception"). In well-known Roman law, the former term designates fraud with "evil intent," while the latter term designates appropriate shrewdness or trickery of precisely the kind that might be justified in dealing with a robber or enemy.
47 Furthermore, in Annotation 32 to Chapter 16 of the TTP Spinoza explicitly recognizes the distinction between dolus malus and dolus bonus, indicating that the proscription of any deception as dolus malus depends on the state.
As we have already seen, Spinoza maintains that "if the utility [of a contract] is taken away, the contract is taken away with it, and is null and void," so that not merely the absence of an enforcing power but equally any other cause of a lack of relative utility in keeping faith for one partner or another can invalidate a contract. Furthermore, as we have also seen, he denies in the TP that a state breaking its word for reasons of utility thereby acts "deceptively or treacherously" [dolo, vel perfidia] and insists that whoever relies on a promise or contract while recognizing that faithful performance is not useful to the other party has only his only "foolishness," not another's bad faith, to blame.
puzzles solved
We are now in a position to resolve the puzzles with which we began. Let us take them up in reverse order.
1. Why does Spinoza say that he, unlike Hobbes, preserves the right of nature intact? As we have seen, Spinoza's social contract differs from Hobbes's in that it does not, by its very terms, cede some rights (for example, the right to hold onto whatever goods one can acquire, the right to say whatever one thinks fit) while retaining others (for example, the right to take sustenance, the right to refrain from dangerous or dishonorable tasks). In particular, for Spinoza, one does not cede to the sovereign power the general right to judge what is most conducive to one's self-preservation while still retaining the particular right to judge whether one is subject to a (relatively?) direct attempt to kill or wound. Rather, right of whatever kind is transferred to precisely the same extent that power is actually transferred. Although in becoming a subject one's power is lessened relative to the state, which acquires power over one, one's "right of nature" remains formally just the same: namely, it is still the right to do whatever one can do. Moreover, in practical terms, one's right of nature actually increases in the state, for one is far more able to act and to achieve one's advantage in cooperation with others than one would be able to do outside it. Indeed, were that not true, one could hardly have been motivated to enter into the social contract at all. Furthermore, the general right of nature itselfin the sense of nature's own right -remains exactly as it was before the social contract, simply arranged differently as a different sum of individual powers of things in nature.
2. Why does Spinoza write that "contrary to Hobbes, reason urges peace in all circumstances?" Although Hobbes does formulate the first law of nature as "to seek peace and follow it," he also expresses it disjunctively: "to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend ourselves."
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Presumably, Spinoza saw this latter formulation as counseling the cessation 48 De Cive 2.1; see also Leviathan i.xiv.4. In Leviathan, Hobbes indicates that, when the prerequisites for the successful pursuit of peace are absent, the law of nature requires only that one intend to pursue peace whenever they become present. In a note to his translation of the TTP, Curley calls attention to the disjunctive character of the passage from De Cive as a possible explanation for Spinoza's note concerning Hobbes. don garrett of efforts towards peace under certain circumstances. For Spinoza, however, peace considered in itself is always a good in the scientific sense and hence always actually to be pursued. It is therefore a rule of reason that one seek it, and seek it "in all circumstances." It does not follow, however, that engaging in war (even while continuing to seek peace) is never good relative to one's other options -or rather, it does not follow that war is never the lesser evil available under the circumstances, and hence an alternative that reason also counsels that one take. Indeed, Spinoza emphasizes that war may be relatively good (that is, the lesser evil) for a state in some circumstances, and presumably he allows that it can also be relatively good for competing individuals in the state of nature as well. The more one is guided by reason, of course, the more one will act as the model free man would act. And to the extent that one resembles the free man, the less one fears death and the more one values social and intellectual cooperation. Beyond that, however, the more free, virtuous, or guided by reason one is, the more power one has to prevent any need for war and to bring about cooperation instead; the inability to bring about this better outcome is always some kind of failing of one's active power. The fact remains, however: what an ideal model would do is not always what it is good for someone to do in order to become closer to that model. This is true whether one's model is that of the idle rich (which is not best attained by a poor man through a life of idleness) or the Spinozistic free man who always refrains from war.
Why does Spinoza write, on the one hand, that violating a promise is sometimes permissible
, and yet on the other that if all human beings were solely guided by reason, they would stand by their contracts completely? Spinoza's claim that some promise-breaking is permissible is not as strong a claim as it may appear, for two reasons. First, we have seen that for Spinoza not all breaking of explicit promises or assurances need constitute either deception or the violation of a valid contract. Indeed, at least in some actual circumstances, is it not contrary to "the honesty which both sound reason and Religion teach us to observe"? Second, the claim that breaking a promise is sometimes permissible is simply a direct consequence of the claim that whatever is within one's power is done by right; it does not by itself entail that doing so is either good, in accordance with reason, or an action of the model free man.
In some cases, nevertheless, it may well be that breaking a promise by deception is not only permissible but the best alternative available -that is, the lesser evil that, under the guidance of reason, one may therefore 20, 2010 9:19 "Promising" ideas 207 reasonably choose in a particular circumstance. 49 Yet this is compatible with Spinoza's claim that if all human beings were guided solely by reason, then they would all stand by their contract completely. For all would have a maximal appreciation of the value of cooperation 50 and would presumably recognize that others did as well, even as they all jointly pursued the mutually acknowledged shareable highest good of knowledge of God in a well-ordered state. Of course, an individual guided solely by reason would also be a completely free man. Such an individual would never find utility in breaking a promise, since he or she would never fear any harm and would always have the means to bring about the cooperation required for maintaining the shared highest good. Nevertheless, guidance solely by reason, like being completely free or perfectly virtuous is literally incompatible with being a human being. Human beings can only approximate these models without ever fully embodying them.
51 For this reason, some deceptive promise-breaking and renunciation of contracts may always remain the lesser of two evils for actual human beings.
Why does Spinoza reject Hobbes's claim that one is obliged to keep a promise made to a robber to return with ransom in return for a present release?
Hobbes and Spinoza agree that a contract can be valid even if the motivation for entering into it was fear. Hobbes justifies his claim that the robber's contract is valid by appeal to a principle that "promises do oblige when there is some benefit received, and that to promise, and the thing promised, be lawful." First performance, for him, renders even an otherwise invalid contract valid -second performance, following trusting first performance, therefore falls under Hobbes's law of nature "to keep covenants made." He could, of course, regard the robber's contract itself as invalid if it were impossible to interpret the captive as willing to perform his part. But while this might be a tempting suggestion, Hobbes cannot avail himself of it, for the robber's own willingness to release the captive depends on the robber's being able to interpret the captive as intending to comply. 49 It is worth noting that in the demonstration of E4p72, Spinoza does not state that the principle of preserving one's being would not dictate treachery (perfidia) to save one's life, but only that it would not do so "without qualification" [omnino], a term that recurs elsewhere in discussions of rational guidance and the ideal of the free man. See Garrett, "Spinoza's Ethical Theory." In fact, action undertaken to preserve one's own life may never qualify as treachery for Spinoza, but only as deception in the broad sense of dolus generally (and not as dolus malus). 50 In fact, anyone promising first performance in a Hobbesian covenant could then generally count on second performers to appreciate the value of cooperation and perform their part as well, leading to general assurance about first performance. 51 In addition to Garrett, "'A Free Man Always Acts Honestly,'" see also Garber, "Dr. Fischelson's Dilemma." 20, 2010 9:19 "Promising" ideas 209
is an element of truth in that verdict, it is much too simple as it stands. Hobbes does exhibit some attraction to thinking of contracts as generating practical obligations even independent of the evaluation of their utility, but his moral and political philosophy remains embedded in a broader context that assigns values on the basis of self-preservation and desire satisfaction. Spinoza does employ a scientific conception of the good as the advantageous, or as what conduces to self-preservation. But self-preservation itself proves to consist not just in continued duration nor even in an affective or cognitive state alone, but also in a state of character -virtue -that is equally a matter of being such as to act in accordance with rules of reason, rules that one freely gives oneself. The full philosophical development of that scheme of value is Spinoza's principal aim of the Ethics. His aim in the TTP, in contrast, is largely to understand and to help bring about the political conditions that can enable each person to live the best kind of life of which he or she is capable -peaceful contentment for the multitude, true freedom and blessedness for the philosophers.
